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political dimensions of technological
innovation. He is blissfully ignorant of
a decade of writing about the process of
military-technical innovation in the
twentieth century. The book has no
compelling theme or interpretive core.
Although this reviewer usually grimaces
when graduate students invoke such de-
ities as Thomas S. Kuhn and Michel
Foucault, this book would have bene-
fited from more theoretical structure.
Terrors and Marvels might also have
profited from more attention to inno-
vations that did not involve the gallant
struggles of Nobel laureates in physics
and chemistry to convince know-
nothing politicians and generals to
adopt their latest schemes to win the war.
Storytelling conquers all. From the per-
spective of military logisticians and
commanders, innovations in food pro-
cessing, materials research, automotive
engineering, computer technology, syn-
thetics, and chemical explosives were
war winners too. Schachtman gives
them all short shrift. His discussion on
preventive medicine and the treatment
of combat trauma wounds is particu-
larly limited, given the rich multi-
volume official histories of the U.S.
armed forces medical establishments in
World War II.
Part of Schachtman’s difficulty is that
he really does not know much about
World War II, apparently alternating
carelessly between the books of Martin
Gilbert and Richard Overy—who, of
course, are blameless for his series of
gaffes. A few samples should suffice:
Ishii Shiro’s final rank was lieutenant
general, not major (p. 318); Iwo Jima
was prized as a fighter base and emer-
gency landing site, not a B-29 base
(p. 298); Japanese troops did not land on
Bataan in December 1941, and they did
not seize “American garrisons at Shang-
hai and Tientsin,” since the 4th Marines
and 15th Infantry had already departed
(p. 166); the 17 August 1943 Eighth Air
Force raid on “Schweinefurt” [sic] was
made by 230 B-17s, not 376, and Ger-
man flak accounted for only six bombers
from the 1st Bombardment Wing, which
lost thirty B-17s to German fighters. In
fact, the entire first paragraph of chapter
7 is riddled with fiction. The sparse
account of Allied military medicine ig-
nores a central fact and accomplish-
ment—wounded survival rates were
important but not as important as the
number of American wounded who
returned to a duty status of some sort.
The number of wounded combatants
who lived to fight another day is dra-
matized in the story of Company E,
506th Parachute Infantry Regiment,
immortalized in word and videotape by
historian Stephen Ambrose. Another
slip is Shachtman’s sketchy account of
the role of operations research and
analysis mathematics; it ignores a mas-
sive literature on operations research in
air warfare, logistics, and antisubmarine
warfare—a literature that Shachtman
apparently does not know.
In sum, a single volume on the influ-
ence of scientific and technological in-
novation on World War II would be
welcome. Terrors and Marvels is not
that book.
ALLAN R. MILLETT
Ohio State University
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Today, when a major weapons system
commonly takes decades or more to de-
velop, it is hard to imagine that the
greatest weapon system of them all, the
Manhattan Project, took just three
years from start to detonation over Ja-
pan. Those three years were the stuff of
high technical and engineering drama:
vast new industrial facilities were con-
structed in secret across the United
States, two billion dollars were spent
without congressional oversight, new
scientific laboratories were secluded in
the high desert, and a unique U.S.
Army Air Forces B-29 unit was created.
All this took place under the direct
command of Major General Leslie
Groves, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
whose management style set a norm for
large systems-development programs
that persists today.
In the popular recollection of the
Manhattan Project, the physicists Rob-
ert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo
Szilard, Edward Teller, and the Los
Alamos Laboratory dominate. They are
attractive figures who have remained in
the public eye. Yet Groves, never a pop-
ular or sympathetic personality, was the
man who put it all together. As such, he
is worthy of serious attention.
Robert Norris, research associate with
the Natural Resources Defense Council
and scholar of nuclear issues, has writ-
ten a long-overdue biography of Gen-
eral Groves. While the central theme of
this work is Groves’s leadership of the
Manhattan Project, Norris does a thor-
ough job of integrating into the story
his formative years, family, Army career
prior to the project, and postwar role in
establishing a national policy for atomic
weapons.
The sheer audacity and scope of the
Manhattan Project remain impressive
today. Based on theory and some criti-
cal experiments at the University of
Chicago in the late 1930s and bolstered
by a letter from Albert Einstein to Pres-
ident Franklin Roosevelt, the United
States in 1942 committed itself to build-
ing an atomic bomb.
Groves, who had had a distinguished
career as an Army engineer and had
been the overseer of the building of the
Pentagon, was selected to head the
Manhattan Project in August 1942.
Within just a few months, Groves
brought together some of the best engi-
neering officers in the Army, initiated
vast land acquisitions for several large
industrial operations for the purpose of
isotope separation, established the basic
technical compartmentalization policies
that shaped the entire project, and
brought into the program a number of
prominent industrial corporations to
build and run the plants. As the project
grew, Groves fought for and won the
highest priority for critical materials
within the government’s wartime allo-
cation scheme, cornered the world mar-
ket for uranium ore, set up the Los
Alamos Laboratory, and appointed
Oppenheimer as director.
Groves was a technically shrewd and
aggressive man with complete confi-
dence in his own judgment and will-
ingness to take enormous technical and
industrial risks with untried processes.
His most remarkable talent was the
ability to oversee and pursue alternative
technical development lines until one
or another was proven successful. In
two important cases he made such
high-risk decisions—isotope separation
and bomb design.
Separation of uranium isotopes on an
industrial scale was a critical step in the
bomb manufacture. At the time, there
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seemed to be three competing methods:
gaseous diffusion, thermal separation,
and electromagnetic separation. Each
method had its advocates and its vir-
tues. None was proven. While the sci-
entific community dithered over the
best technical method, Groves charged
in and, with real managerial brass, initi-
ated simultaneous and parallel develop-
ment of all three separation methods,
making the largest bet on the gaseous-
diffusion method at Oak Ridge.
As the engineering worked out, using
the partially enriched product from the
thermal and the electromagnetic sepa-
ration processes as feedstock for gas-
eous diffusion gave accelerated results,
and the enriched uranium was ready on
time for the bomb.
Initially, there were two quite different
design approaches to building the
bomb. The most obvious was the gun
assembly technique, in which two
subcritical masses of enriched uranium
were explosively driven and held to-
gether until nuclear fission began and
was sustained. This design became the
“Little Boy” bomb that was dropped on
Hiroshima in the world’s first atomic
attack.
However, theory held that the use of
plutonium would produce a far more
efficient means of nuclear detonation.
Plutonium is an artificial element, bred
in a uranium-fueled reactor that is
formed into a hollow sphere and
implosively crushed with high explo-
sives until a nuclear detonation occurs.
This proved to be a demanding techni-
cal problem requiring massive indus-
trial sites for plutonium production at
Hanford, Washington, and nearly all
the talent at Los Alamos to calculate
and form the sphere and the surround-
ing high explosives.
Again, Groves made the call, and both
avenues were followed, at great cost,
until the TRINITY test at Alamogordo,
New Mexico, proved the plutonium
implosion, which was used in the “Fat
Man” bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, histori-
ans have devoted nearly as much energy
to debating who made the decision to
use the bomb as was released in the
atomic explosions. Norris goes into this
in some detail, looking specifically at
Groves’s role in decision making. He
concludes that, as is commonly the case
with large weapons development pro-
jects in wartime, the momentum of the
project drove the outcome. The bomb
was ready, an invasion of Japan looked
to be murderously costly, momentum
carried the day, and the bomb was
dropped on Japan.
Norris’s book is a fine complement to
Richard Rhodes’s The Making of the
Atomic Bomb (1986), in which Rhodes
covers the physics of the bomb. Both
books chronicle events that changed the
world.
FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Wright, Patrick. Tank: The Progress of a Mon-
strous War Machine. New York: Viking Penguin,
2002. 499pp. $29.95
The tank constitutes perhaps the most
readily identifiable symbol of land war-
fare. From its initial appearance during
World War I to the final stage of the
Gulf War, its considerable impact on
the outcome of some of last century’s
most significant wars is not in doubt.
Whether battles were fought on the
plains of Eastern Europe or in the deserts
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